




A game played according to Lukashenka’s rules:  
the political opposition in Belarus
Tomasz Bakunowicz
The Belarusian opposition is currently experiencing its deepest crisis since Alyaksandr Lukashenka took power 
in 1994. Following many months of negotiations, opposition leaders failed to select a joint candidate for the 
presidential election scheduled for 11th October. The failure of this latest round of talks has proven that not 
only is the opposition unlikely to threaten Lukashenka’s rule; it will not even be able to demonstrate to society 
that it could provide a genuine alternative to the present government.
The presidential election in 2010 was a painful landmark for the opposition. The repression that accompanied 
the election has largely weakened political circles opposed to the government. Against this backdrop, the 
traditional internal problems of the opposition have worsened, such as its incapacity to reach agreement and 
develop a common, coherent operational strategy, the excessive ambitions of the leaders of particular groups, 
the low level of political maturity, mutual distrust and frequent personal conflicts. As a result the opposition has 
for years been unable to gain confidence in society and reach beyond the limited number (20%) of staunch 
proponents of democratic transformations. Given the fact that the Belarusian opposition is fragmented and 
lacks one clear leader, the readiness to support individual leaders does not exceed several per cent, according 
to independent surveys. Lukashenka’s present political opponents rather resemble a group of dissidents, than 
constitute a genuine opposition to the government. The crisis and helplessness of opposition circles are more 
acute given Belarus’s internal situation since for the first time Alyaksandr Lukashenka will run his presidential 
campaign in the context of the economic crisis and a forecasted fall in GDP.
The opposition and the political system
One of the characteristic features of the authoritarian regime established by Lukashenka is the fact that there 
is no single party with a hold on power. In Belarus there are several officially registered political parties which 
endorse the politics of the government, for example the Belarusian Agrarian Party, the Belarusian Patriotic Party 
or the Belarusian Social and Sports Party. They are however façade parties which do not have any significance 
in the country’s political life. Lukashenka has based his power on a hierarchical system of verticals which is 
composed of the loyal nomenclature, officials and an extensive security system. This manner of ruling a state 
is aimed at eliminating the possibility that another centre of power, besides from the presidential one, could 
emerge and consolidate. For this reason the very idea of a party system is discredited in the regime’s ideology 
as pathogenic and not serving the interests of Belarusian society. It particularly concerns opposition parties 
and groups. For 20 years of Lukashenka’s rule the regime has subjected the opposition to a repressive policy 
and referred to it as a ‘fifth column’.
Repression can take many forms: from prison sentences, frequent arrests, dismissals from jobs or education 
establishments, to other forms of everyday intimidation. The application of similar methods is supposed to warn 
society against becoming involved and supporting the opposition. The Belarusian government, however, has 
not decided to wipe out the institutional opposition completely. Its existence is intended to give the impression 
of political pluralism in Belarus, confirming the state’s democratic and modern character. Furthermore, the legal 
opposition (which is subject to legal regulations) channels a part of social discontent and thus makes it easier 
for it to be controlled by the security services. However, when it feels threatened, Lukashenka’s regime does 
not hesitate to use direct violence against opposition members. Following the brutally quelled demonstration 
after the presidential election held in December 2010 seven presidential candidates were arrested. Some of 
them were given prison sentences. One of them, Mikalay Statkevich remains imprisoned. Several candidates 
were forced to leave the country following persecution. Hundreds of opposition activists were victims of 
repression.
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The present state of the opposition
The opposition in Belarus is quite diverse; it encompasses groups which vary in their ideologies, ranging 
from communists and liberals, former members of the Soviet nomenclature to youth national activists. The 
fundamental criterion shared by all is their declared opposition to Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s rule.
The Belarusian opposition forces claim to have several thousand activists. It should however be noted that the 
data provided by the opposition parties and movements are usually inflated. Furthermore, apart from leaders 
in Minsk and in the regions, the majority of the rank and file do not actually participate in their parties’ activity 
or in social activity. The opposition focuses its activity above all on subsequent election campaigns (which is 
manifested mainly in the high intensity of leadership meetings), while everyday work between campaigns 
remains relatively less significant. Furthermore, a large part of the activity is Internet-based that often serves 
as a substitute for everyday activity in the public sphere. Another growing problem for the opposition is the 
lack of intergenerational change. Many leaders of the opposition parties have remained in their positions for 
years.
The Belarusian opposition parties and movements cannot reach agreement in such fundamental issues 
as choosing a joint candidate for presidential elections or a possible boycott of elections. The inability of 
opposition leaders to develop a long-term political and social strategy which would be adapted to the situation 
does not reflect well on their political maturity. Furthermore, the opposition leaders rarely establish genuine co-
operation with experts in Belarus. Many of their demands are confined to formulas which have been repeated 
for 20 years (such as ‘the range of participants in the political process should be extended’) or do not sound 
very appropriate or realistic (e.g. ‘a million new jobs’). The low level of mutual trust among the opposition 
leaders does not contribute to the opposition’s cohesion. Personal conflicts, mutual accusations of destructive 
actions and collaboration with the security services are a permanent element of the life of the opposition 
parties and movements.
The above factors have led to a low level of confidence and popularity of the opposition in Belarusian society. 
This is also linked to the low potential for mobilisation of opposition circles, their inability to reach out to a 
broader social section. Actions and appeals which ‘preach to the converted’, that is proponents of democratic 
transformations, in fact cause the opposition to constantly seek favours of the same electorate.
There is no doubt that the general inertia of Belarusian society, which has been effectively preserved by 
the repressive regime, is an additional challenge for the functioning of the opposition. A slight majority of 
Belarusians declare they would be in favour of reforms intended to improve the economic situation in the 
country, while simultaneously they claim they are not ready to bear the costs of such reforms. The majority 
of Belarusians seem to believe that it is Lukashenka, not the opposition, who has the formula for solving the 
country’s present economic problems. Few demonstrations of social discontent, e.g. by small business owners, 
were staged by those outside the institutional opposition.
Western donors are also becoming disillusioned with the Belarusian opposition. In the present situation they see 
more benefits in supporting long-term projects aiming at building and strengthening Belarusian identity. Even 
Lidziya Yarmoshyna, the chairwoman of the Central Election Commission of Belarus who supports Lukashenka, 
has been mocking the opposition’s excessive passivity.
At present, the opposition forces are basically divided into two main coalitions. The first one is the alliance of 
parties which coordinate the ‘people’s referendum’. It is mainly composed of: the BPF Party, the ‘Movement for 
Freedom’, the ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign and the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (Assembly). The campaign 
of the ‘people’s referendum’, which was launched in 2013, is an attempt to reach out to Belarusian society 
through collecting signatures of support for the proposed socio-political reforms. The proposed reforms consist 
of six questions and include: the need to keep access to education and healthcare free of charge, to limit the 
president to two terms in office, and support for integration with the EU. The authors of the campaign, besides 
their intention to make use of the action in order to target a wider social base, have declared they wanted to 
collect 500,000 signatures which would then be transferred to the administration to be verified and to hold 
a nationwide referendum. On 17 March 2014 it was officially announced that 50,000 people had signed the 
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petition, on 4 February it was 90,000, and on 20 May 2015 during an Internet-based conference one of the 
leaders of the action Tatsyana Karatkevich said that 120,000 signatures had been collected. Contrary to the 
announcement and declarations of the campaign’s leaders, it has not made a wide impact in society.
The second coalition is the Talaka Civil Alliance for Fair and Honest Elections for a Better Life, which was 
established in September 2013. It is composed above all of two parties: the liberal United Civic Party of Belarus 
and the post-Communist Belarusian Left Party ‘A Just World’. This alliance is rather tactical, motivated by the 
will to find an ally by the parties which have not joined the ‘people’s referendum’ campaign. The leaders of both 
parties have announced that they will separately seek to be appointed a candidate in this year’s presidential 
election, which proves the alliance is ineffective.
The preparations for the presidential election
The question of choosing a joint candidate has been the main topic of discussions and disputes of the 
opposition in the last two years. Initially, the two main coalitions were unable to reach agreement about the 
way in which the candidate would be selected. After the concept of holding a joint congress had prevailed, 
negotiations about the modes of selecting delegates for the congress were launched. The so-called ‘seven’ 
took part in them, that is four main parties forming the ‘people’s referendum’, two from Talaka and the 
organisational committee of the Belarusian Christian Democracy party. In November 2014 it was announced, 
in an atmosphere of mutual accusations and allegations, that the attempt to reach an agreement had failed 
and the topic of a joint candidate and the congress was deemed to be closed. In consequence, the following 
persons, among others, declared they were willing to be the opposition candidate in this year’s election:
• Tatsyana Karatkevich – she presents herself as a candidate of the ‘people’s referendum’. In fact, only 
the ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign and the BPF Party have declared support for her candidacy. The Belarusian 
Social Democratic Party (Assembly) has announced that it will not appoint or support any candidate 
(which is odd since Karatkevich, besides her involvement in the ‘Tell the Truth’ campaign is also a member 
of ‘Assembly’). The ‘Movement for Freedom’, led by Alyaksandr Milinkevich, the former candidate in the 
2006 presidential election, has also announced that he will not endorse any candidate. Despite this it 
can be inferred from what the leaders of the parties forming the ‘people’s referendum’ say that the rank 
and file of ‘Assembly’ and the ‘Movement for Freedom’ may become involved in the organisation of the 
Karatkevich election campaign.
• Anatol Lyabedzka – whose candidacy has been submitted by the United Civic Party of Belarus of which 
he is the chairman.
• Syarhey Kalyakin– appointed by the Belarusian Left Party ‘A Just World’ of which he is the leader.
• Also Syarhey Haydukevich, the leader of the pro-Lukashenka Liberal Democratic Party, has declared his 
readiness to run in the presidential election. Haydukevich, who is called a traditional sparring partner 
for Lukashenka, already participated in the elections as a candidate in 2001 and 2006. In 2010, after 
the government had decided to implement the election scenario with the participation of as many as 10 
candidates, Haydukevich withdrew his candidacy just before the election.
The opposition has not also succeeded in reaching agreement about a possible common boycott of the election. 
This option, which stems from the conviction that the state administration, being subordinated to Lukashenka, 
fixes election results, is traditionally considered before the elections. This year the concept of a boycott would 
be linked with the opposition proposing the symbolic candidacy of Mikalay Statkevich, a candidate in the 
2010 presidential election who is still serving a prison sentence. This action would in fact be an information 
campaign on political prisoners, Belarus’s repressive regime, and the lack of sense of the election process in 
this situation. Disputes have already appeared at the stage of opposition leaders ascribing themselves the 
authorship of the idea and then different scenarios of its realisation. Certain leaders have opted for announcing 
Statkevich as a symbolic, common candidate of the opposition, and when the registration of his initiative group 
is refused, to call for a complete boycott of the election. Another section of the opposition leaders declared that 
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they could use the participation in the election and the collection of signatures in support of a real candidacy to 
inform society about Statkevich and other political prisoners (possibly to collect signatures in support of their 
release). Nor have talks between opposition leaders led to the development of a common strategy in this area.
As a result of further misunderstandings inside the opposition, Uladzimir Nyaklyaeu, the leader of the ‘Tell the 
Truth’ campaign and the most popular opposition politician in recent years, has announced he is leaving the 
‘Tell the Truth’ campaign and the opposition structures in general. He has also announced that he is going 
to establish a new social movement ‘For the Statehood and Independence of Belarus’. Nyaklyaeu’s initiative 
is in fact another attempt to renew opposition structures by building a so-called third force (apart from the 
government and the institutional opposition). Its objective would be to transcend the current mobilisation 
limitations of the opposition, by referring to such common values as statehood and independence, and to gain 
wide social support. This is not a new idea. Similar motivations for establishing a large social movement were 
declared by: Alyaksandr Kazulin who formed the ‘People’s Will’ movement in 2006, Alyaksandr Milinkevich 
who established the ‘Movement for Freedom’ in 2006 and Nyaklyaeu himself since in 2010 he launched the 
‘Tell the Truth’ campaign. It appears that the newly launched movement will encounter the same problems 
as its predecessors. It is not enough for someone to state they are not part of the compromised opposition 
in order to gain a better status in the eyes of society, since society is not quite aware of the details of the 
opposition’s internal schisms. Furthermore, as the surveys indicate, Belarusian society does not have a sense 
of the state’s independence being threatened. Paradoxically, also the slogans of independence and statehood 
have been to a large extent hijacked by Alyaksandr Lukashenka who has started including topics underlining 
the distinctiveness of Belarus and the Belarusian nation in the official circuit after 2000. This rhetoric has been 
intensified over the last year, in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the promotion of the idea of 
the ‘Russian world’.
The opposition and its external and internal challenges
The events in Ukraine have caused many Belarusian citizens to experience a sense of threat of internal chaos 
and destabilisation, which has had a fundamental impact on the opposition’s situation. According to surveys, 
the majority of Belarusian society interprets the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and the war in the east of Ukraine 
in line with Russian propaganda, i.e. as a result of protests on Kyiv’s Maidan, and not the Russian invasion. 
The government in Minsk is trying to use these elements for its own purposes by emphasising, as part of its 
propaganda, Belarus’s stability. This is crucial, particularly with regard to the present economic challenges. 
Belarus’s GDP for January-May 2015 fell by 3% (according to the International Monetary Fund’s forecasts, in 
2015 it will decrease by 2.3%, and according to the World Bank, by 3.5%). Foreign trade, including exports, 
in this period fell sharply (by 28.3%). This was mainly due to the economic recession in Russia, which is 
Belarus’s main trading partner – in 2014 Russia accounted for 50% of all trade. Between January and April 
2015 real revenues of Belarusians also dropped by 4.2%. According to the NISEPI surveys of June 2015, 
72% of respondents stated that the Belarusian economy is in crisis and 80.6% feared another devaluation 
of the Belarusian ruble (the previous one took place in December 2014). However, the present economic 
situation has not contributed to Belarusian society being more prepared to engage in protests. Lacking a 
real alternative, many Belarusians see Lukashenka as the guarantor of the state’s stability and hope he will 
improve the situation. The Belarusian opposition, out of its weakness, has not only been unable to use the 
present economic problems to its advantage, it was also unsuccessful during the economic downturn in 2011 
when, following the crisis and two devaluations of the Belarusian currency, support for Lukashenka fell to 
approximately 20% (according to the NISEPI data in June this year it was at 38.6%). This decline, however, 
has not led to increased popularity and confidence in the opposition. Additionally discredited street protests 
in the eyes of Belarusian society following the Maidan demonstrations present another difficult challenge for 
the opposition. In the last presidential campaigns the opposition presented the idea of a mass protest (often 
termed ‘Ploshcha’ – a ‘square’) as a fundamental or even the only possible way of bringing about a change 
in power in Belarus. Confronted with this new situation, the opposition leaders have unanimously distanced 
themselves from the willingness to organise the traditional post-election protests. This reluctance stems not 
only from the lack of support for the concept of protest in Belarusian society but also from the fear of Russia’s 
aggressive position when such protests break out. The opposition has thus been deprived of one of the main 
tools of its activity. Also due to the new geopolitical situation, the topic of Russia has not appeared so far in 
internal debates and disputes of Lukashenka’s opponents in the context of this year’s election. Accusations 
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of Russian financial support between rivals in the presidential campaigns in 2006 and 2010 were an inherent 
element of election campaigns run by the opposition. Certain opposition leaders have also used this card of 
Russian support in their game in order to increase their own rank. Furthermore, unlike in the previous election 
campaigns, the Russian ambassador to Minsk Aleksandr Surikov already on 10 June stated that Moscow will 
support Alyaksandr Lukashenka in the upcoming election.
The negative balance sheet
So far the balance sheet of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s opponents should be assessed as negative. For years they 
have not only been unable to threaten his hold on power, they have not even moved closer to the realisation 
of any of their declared fundamental objectives: presenting themselves as an alternative, attractive political 
option and convincing the broadest sections of society to believe in the idea of democratic and economic 
transformations.
The Belarusian regime has succeeded in imposing its own rules of the game on the opposition and in relegating 
it to the margins of social life. However, it is in the regime’s interest for a weak, marginalised opposition to take 
part in the election. The opposition does not present a threat to Lukashenka’s power and its participation in the 
election tends to be used as an argument proving the democratic character of the political system in Belarus. 
This is important for Minsk, particularly in the context of the attempts made by the Belarusian government, 
against the backdrop of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, to normalise its relations with the West. However, at 
present, unlike before the presidential election in 2010, these attempts are not accompanied by even the 
pretence of internal liberalisation. On the contrary, the government is ostentatiously applying more pressure on 
political prisoners and independent circles. This should be expected to continue during the election campaign 
proper. The Belarusian government has drawn conclusions from the 2010 election campaign. At that time even 
a controlled relaxation of the internal situation (allowing seven opposition candidates to run for the election, 
granting more space to public canvassing) consequently led to post-election protests and then an internal crisis 
and Belarus’s deeper isolation in the international community. The central authorities in Minsk will therefore 
seek at all costs to avoid repeating this situation.
